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COPING WITH COMPLEXITY
Alyson C. Flournoy*
There are many lessons to be drawn from the past twenty-five years
of environmental regulation-lessons about interdependence in the natu-
ral, geopolitical, and economic realms; lessons about ecology and bi-
odiversity; and lessons about international trade and economics. In part,
all of these are lessons about the ever-increasing complexity that charac-
terizes our relationship to the environment. Closely linked with this
theme is our limited knowledge in this area as we try to understand and
respond to the complex reality of environmental degradation. How well
we cope with this complexity and uncertainty will be an important deter-
minant of the success of our regulatory enterprise in the coming years.
Developing analytic techniques that account for the complex and
uncertain facts and values involved in regulatory decisions will be a key
part of any successful response to the challenges we face. This Essay
suggests how analytic tools provided by the physical and social sciences
can play a valuable role in responding to the difficult task we face. How-
ever, it emphasizes the limits of what these sciences can tell us. Ulti-
mately, scientists and economists cannot tell us what questions to ask,
how to balance competing values, or how much proof to demand.
Lawmakers, scientists, and regulators together must assess the value of
analytic techniques developed by scientists and economists, and of the
information these techniques provide, in light of the policies envisioned
by our laws. As we critically assess new and existing techniques, this
Essay suggests that an important question to ask is whether these tech-
niques permit decision makers and the public to make the best informed
choices in light of the complex and uncertain issues involved.
This Essay begins with a brief look back at the history of the past
twenty-five years of environmental regulation. I then offer illustrations
from two different fields of environmental law-natural resource protec-
tion and toxics regulation-to demonstrate how analysis under current
laws has proven inadequate to cope with the complexity and uncertainty
we have begun to recognize. This Essay also describes two promising
analytic techniques being developed-one in the area of wetlands permit-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida; A.B., 1979, Princeton University;
J.D., 1983, Harvard University. The Author is grateful to Donald Elliott, Lakshman Gurus-
wamy, Carol Rose, and Gerald Torres for their thoughtful critiques of a draft of this Essay.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ting, the other in toxics regulation. These initiatives offer examples of
how scientists, policy makers, and lawmakers working together can iden-
tify analytic techniques that permit the best informed choices within the
regulatory context.
I. A LOOK BACK: THE EMERGENCE OF COMPLEXITY AND
UNCERTAINTY
In the earliest days of the modern environmental movement, there
was little question about what our problems were: the concrete and per-
ceptible blights of the burning Cuyahoga River, of the Santa Barbara oil
spill and its animal victims, and of human illness caused by air pollution.
The causes of these ills seemed equally apparent to many: profitable eco-
nomic activity, undertaken with insufficient attention to environmental
consequences. The solutions to these problems appeared straightfor-
ward: Eliminate the harmful discharges into air and water, thereby pro-
tecting human health and the environment. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970,' the Clean Water Act of 1977,2 and other major
legislation of the early 1970s charted an ambitious course to achieve
these goals.
A number of important statutes enacted during the 1970s and 1980s
focused on a single medium or resource and its observable symptoms of
environmental stress. Responding to apparent degradation, many stat-
utes directed the executive branch to regulate private conduct to assure
some less-than-absolute degree of protection of environmental values.
These standards typically mandated agencies to balance technological
feasibility and economic impacts on the one hand against concerns for
health and environmental quality on the other. The standards were usu-
ally only vaguely defined by Congress, their full meaning to be articu-
lated through the regulatory process.3 Congress contemplated the use of
tools such as cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. But agency deci-
sion makers were afforded much discretion to interpret statutory goals
and to determine how to use relevant analytic tools in achieving these
goals.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
2. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
3. This model can be found across the range of pollution control and resource protection
laws. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1988); National Forest Management
Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3) (1988); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991).
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By the mid-1970s certain difficulties with this statutory model had
become apparent. First, the lack of critical information on feasibility and
environmental and economic issues made standard setting an arduous
process. Regulatory decisions were in many cases subject to challenge
because of inadequate supporting data or analysis. The result was often-
lengthy battles challenging agency decisions in the courts.
Second, in part due to Congress's meager direction on policies and
priorities, regulators often claimed scientific authority as the basis for
regulatory decisions that could not be entirely justified by scientific
method. Regulators understandably sought refuge in scientific analysis
and conclusions to bolster the controversial policy decisions necessitated
by vague statutory directives. But this too facilitated challenges to
agency decisions. It also tended to keep certain important policy choices,
disguised as scientific conclusions, hidden from public view. Inadequate
public understanding of policy choices and the black-and-white picture
of environmental problems presented in the media contributed to a dis-
torted public perception of environmental problems and, in some cases, a
lack of public support for environmental regulation.' Third, it became
clear that ambitious and rigorous statutory goals sometimes entailed un-
anticipated economic consequences. In response to these problems, stat-
utory deadlines were pushed back, goals were modified, and agencies
lumbered on with their herculean task.
Scientific knowledge evolved rapidly over this period, revealing new
dimensions of natural systems and our impacts on them. We have be-
come aware of new problems,6 and of the interrelationship among sys-
tems and phenomena previously treated as independent.7 An ever-
4. See David Schoenbrod, EnvironmentalLaw and Growing Up, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 357,
365-66 (1989).
5. The average citizen has consistently expressed a willingness to pay more for environ-
mental protection. See, e.g., ROPER ORG., THE ENVIRONMENT: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (1990). Yet average citizens generally do not support regulatory deci-
sions that entail personal economic sacrifice. The causes of this dissonance are complex and
varied. But a process that masks the factual and normative complexity of regulatory decisions
has made it much easier for the public to deny responsibility for policy choices. Thus, citizens
can be simultaneously outraged at the Exxon Valdez incident (It was his or their fault.), at the
prospect of a higher gasoline tax (Why should I have to pay?), at the garbage barge (Something
should be done.), and at the prospect of higher fees for municipal garbage disposal (Why
should I have to pay?).
6. These problems include groundwater pollution, hazardous waste disposal, ozone de-
pletion, global warming, and acid rain.
7. For example, we now see the importance of the relationships among elements in an
ecosystem, we recognize some previously unconsidered economic consequences of regulation,
and we are grappling with the role of international trade and lending in promoting environ-
mental degradation.
April 1994]
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increasing body of information has potential relevance to regulatory deci-
sions. Pollution, we have been forced to realize, is not solely a result of
inattention or evil minds and cannot be entirely eliminated without radi-
cal change to our society and our economy. Our economy is based on
practices that generate enormous environmental impacts, some of which
we lack the resources, the know-how, or the will to eliminate. The
causes of environmental degradation, direct and indirect, are more nu-
merous than we had realized and less susceptible of complete explana-
tion. Moreover, the natural systems affected are more complex than we
earlier realized-or cared to admit. Thus, both the scientific issues and
the policy choices involved in regulation are more complex than initially
appeared to be the case.
Our growing knowledge base has not meant the elimination of un-
certainty. As some gaps in our understanding have been eliminated, they
have been replaced by other, sometimes more profound, sources of
doubt. Uncertainty often characterizes our understanding of the com-
plex systems and phenomena we have begun to recognize.8
As scientific knowledge has advanced and revealed new dimensions
of environmental problems, our laws have only partially kept pace. In
the area of pollution control, we have continued to work with a medium-
specific approach, although the interdependence of natural elements has
come to be viewed as central to meaningful analysis of environmental
impacts.9 In resource protection the need for an ecosystemic approach
demands that we consider new laws to supplement existing mandates.10
Our laws regarding public resource and species protection do not ade-
quately respond to the reality of the extinction crisis: that the causes of
species extinction are profoundly embedded in long-accepted but unac-
ceptable economic practices, and that preserving species will require eco-
nomic adjustment for some individuals, industries, and regions. In toxics
8. For example, uncertainties limit our understanding of how various elements of an
ecosystem relate to each other, how chemical substances affect human health, and whether and
how climatic change may result from ozone depletion and greenhouse gas emissions.
9. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and Clean Water Act of 1977 continue to
anchor our pollution control efforts. Recent initiatives by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) under Administrator Browner, however, have placed new emphasis on mul-
timedia enforcement. See Peter J. Fontaine, EPA s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The
Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1993);
'Reconsolidation' of Authority Would Lead to Stronger EPA Enforcement, Browner Says, [24
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 547 (July 30, 1993).
10. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's proposals to pursue an ecosystem-based approach to
species protection represent a step in this direction under the current administration. See Wil-
liam K. Stevens, Interior Secretary Is Pushing a New Way to Save Species, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1993, at Al.
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regulation we have followed the early-adopted strategy of evaluating
each candidate substance independently and focusing almost solely on
cancer risk, despite growing evidence that cumulative, synergistic, and
noncancer effects from these substances may be important "1 Moreover,
in controlling toxics, we have relied on a data-intensive approach that
predicates regulation on an often-unattainable volume of information.
Two examples follow that are drawn from this history; they high-
light the shortcomings of our current regulatory approach when con-
fronted with complexity and uncertainty. I emphasize the ways in which
thoughtful attention to analytic techniques and their application may re-
spond to these shortcomings, and offer two examples of promising regu-
latory initiatives.
II. COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN SPECIES
PRESERVATION LAW
A. Lessons from the Past
One need not look beyond the well-known controversy over protec-
tion of the northern spotted owl and old-growth forests in the Pacific
Northwest for an example of how the complexity of environmental
problems and the limits of our understanding are inadequately accounted
for under existing law. In enacting and amending laws relating to public
land management and species preservation, Congress has recognized cer-
tain essential ecological facts. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA)12 reflects the fact that protection of species depends upon protec-
tion of the species's habitat. The statute also reflects some understanding
by Congress of the array of competing interests and values affected by
listing and designation decisions.1 3 Public land management mandates
similarly call for a balancing of competing interests in planning for the
use of public forests, with a mandate for sustainability.
But, as the controversy over preservation of old growth and the owl
demonstrated, these statutes provided an inadequate framework for con-
sidering the full array of relevant values and facts. Decisions under the
11. Hearings on "How Safe is Safe Enough?: Risk Assessment and the Regulatory Process"
Before the U.S. House ofRepresentatives Comm. on Science, Space & Technology, Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993) (testimony of John A. Moore,
President, Institute for Evaluating Health Risks).
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The ESA generally requires designa-
tion of critical habitat for listed species and accords these areas protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1533
(1988).
13. The ESA provides for consideration of the competing interests affected by species and
habitat preservation through the habitat designation process and the exemption process. Id.
§§ 1533(b), 1536(h).
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ESA and other applicable laws have not ended the controversy. Instead,
the national attention attracted to the controversy has given rise to deci-
sion-making vehicles outside the statutory processes. 14 In these fora, de-
cision makers and the public have considered the changing profile of a
regional culture and economy, international trade policies, long-standing
public land management practices, and the nature of the ecosystem, as
well as the many values represented not only by the owl but also by the
ancient forests. Many of these facets of the dispute were largely irrele-
vant under the applicable statutes.1
5
The shortcomings of our statutory framework are understandable,
in that the ESA and our public land management laws were not designed
with ecosystem preservation or regional economic transitions in mind.' 6
And the analytic techniques upon which we have traditionally relied,
such as quantitative cost-benefit analysis, perform poorly in valuing re-
sources over a relatively long period of time. The question this raises is
how to account for the broader dimensions of conflicts between endan-
gered species-and ecosystems-and economic activity. Not only will an
analysis better tailored to such controversies be complex, but significant
gaps in our understanding of the relevant systems and phenomena are
inevitable. As we come to understand the complexity, we inevitably also
see new boundaries of our knowledge and understanding.
One obvious response is to broaden statutes' scope as necessary to
ensure consideration of all relevant factors.17 Such measures will un-
doubtedly contribute to the improvement of our laws. But this Essay
focuses on a different facet of our response: improving the analytic meth-
ods employed in regulatory decision making in response to the twin chal-
lenges of complexity and uncertainty.
Traditional quantitative cost-benefit analysis has provided and can
continue to provide helpful information for assessing the trade offs in-
volved in environmental disputes. But we know that not all benefits can
14. These include the so-called Timber Summit of 1989, see Bryan M. Johnston & Paul J.
Krupin, The 1989 Pacific Northwest Timber Compromise: An Environmental Dispute Resolu-
tion Case Study of a Successful Battle That May Have Lost the War, 27 WLLAMErrn L. REV.
613 (1991), and the conference in April 1993, attended by President Clinton and Vice Presi-
dent Gore, see Timothy Egan, Clinton Under Crossfire at Logging Conference, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1993, at A6. These laws suffered much criticism for their failure to address relevant
issues. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem" Learning from the Old-
Growth Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 316-18 (1993).
15. See Flournoy, supra note 14, at 316-18.
16. See id. at 301-06.
17. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Reopening of the Environmen-
tal Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 463, for a useful discussion of the problems caused by fragmen-
tation in our statutory framework and some proposed solutions.
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be quantified adequately, and that economic valuation can provide little
guidance on the value of resources over a long period of time. So impor-
tant normative judgments must be made in resolving controversies over
resource use that quantitative cost-benefit analysis cannot cover. 18 We
must at least question, in light of our richer understanding of the com-
plexities involved, whether existing statutes and the current applications
of quantitative techniques-such as cost-benefit analysis-under these
laws provide a sufficient framework for addressing the more complex ar-
ray of facts and values.
When fundamental value choices must be made among preservation
of unique ecosystems-for the services they perform as well as their in-
herent value-and short- and long-term economic impact on individuals
and a region with due regard for the role in the conflict played by inter-
national trade policies, industry management decisions, and historic gov-
ernment practices in public land management, traditional applications of
cost-benefit analysis may be inadequate. To integrate the multiplicity of
variables and systematically evaluate the impact of various policy options
may demand more sophisticated applications of cost-benefit analysis that
can coherently integrate both quantifiable and nonquantifiable values.
The analysis must be able to accommodate a certain degree of what we
might call vagueness or fuzziness. 9 The best analytic tool may not be
one that produces a single, neat answer in quantitative form-which may
mask important value choices-but a method that informs decision mak-
ers and the public about what policy options are available in light of what
18. For a discussion of some of the shortcomings of strict cost-benefit analysis as a tool for
guiding action in the case of the spotted owl, see BARRY S. MULDER ET AL., U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., EXCLUSION PROCESS: CRITICAL HABITAT AND THE NORTHERN SPOTTED
OWL 4 (1992) (noting that Congress has stated that value of species is "incalculable"; that
preservation, off-site and intrinsic benefits of species preservation are not traded in markets and
thus are difficult to value; that cost-benefit analysis does not incorporate distributional con-
cerns; and that uncertainties preclude accurate estimation of impact of incremental regulatory
decisions on value associated with species). See also M.L. SCHAMBERGER ET AL., ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION EFFECTS FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED
OWL 68-77 (1992) (providing discussion of various benefits of critical habitat designation and
noting that comprehensive dollar estimates of many benefits are impossible with available
data); RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES COMM., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 8 (1990) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK] (noting that quantitative methodologies
which discount value of natural resources in future are incompatible with goal of sustaining
economic development over time, and that some subjective value judgments must be made in
prioritizing risk which cannot be quantified).
19. I borrow this term from the field of computer science, where recent applications of
"fuzzy logic" have permitted engineers to design computer programs that go beyond binary
approaches to "paint gray, commonsense pictures of an uncertain world." Bart Kosko &
Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, ScI. AM., July 1993, at 76.
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science and economics can tell us.2 ° Such a method will permit us to
make the best-informed choices in light of the complexity we confront,
neither reducing it to an artificial simplicity nor allowing it to paralyze
US.
What would such a method look like? How would it differ from
traditional quantitative analysis supplemented by an ad hoc balancing of
unquantified factors? Following is a brief description of an approach de-
veloped by scientists and resource economists that responds to similar
problems in the context of wetlands permitting decisions. It does not
provide an easy or complete answer to the problems outlined above, but
it suggests a direction that we may need to pursue in the years ahead.
B. The Application of Multiple Alternative-Multiple Attribute Analysis
to Wetlands Permitting Decisions
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977 and the implementing
regulations require that applications to dredge or fill wetlands be evalu-
ated under both the Army Corps of Engineers' broad "public interest"
balancing test and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) sec-
tion 404(b)(1) water quality guidelines.2 This involves an analysis some-
what similar to the analysis under the resource protection statutes
described above, in that it entails a general weighing of the costs and
benefits associated with decisions concerning natural resource use.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis can be a useful tool in assessing the rela-
tive values at stake in these decisions. However, our evolving under-
standing of wetlands ecosystems has made us aware that we do not yet
fully understand the functioning of wetlands or the role they play in rela-
tion to neighboring ecosystems. Traditional cost-benefit analysis may
permit us to account for the value of an identified wetland parcel in isola-
tion from the ecosystem. Yet this approach excludes values we know to
be associated with the wetland in its larger environmental context. We
are still far from being able to quantify all the values that may be affected
by wetlands alteration. 2
20. See MULDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 4.
21. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); 40 C.F.R. § 230.11 (1993); 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4 (1993).
22. For example, efforts to quantify the value of a foregone sensory or recreational experi-
ence, the cultural value of a resource-such as its potential to support educational research or
to provide artistic inspiration-the value of natural services provided by an ecosystem or a
wetland, or the option or inheritance value of a lost natural resource-such as a species or a
type of forest-are controversial at best. See Clyde F. Kiker & Gary D. Lynne, Wetlands
Values and Valuing Wetlands, in ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT IN TIDAL MARSHES: A
MODEL FROM THE GULF OF MEXICO (C.L. Coultas & Y.P. Hsieh eds., forthcoming 1994)
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In the face of this uncertainty and complexity, we can fall into the
trap of reductionism, quantifying some values and ignoring those we can-
not fully understand or quantify. We can try to improve on this by in-
cluding a laundry list of unquantified values, but the task of weighing
apples and oranges is clumsy and imprecise. Under section 404 review
the difficulties in integrating these incommensurables is all the more ap-
parent due to the involvement of two agencies and the tension inherent in
balancing the relatively precise values comprehended in the EPA water
quality evaluation23 and the fuzzier Corps public interest review.24 One
danger is that the shiny quantifiables may always appear weightier than
the fuzzy, less tangible values. Moreover, the comparison of dollar and
nondollar values may be poorly explained and thus poorly understood by
the public, if it is not part of a systematic analysis.2" We can simplify our
analysis by focusing only on the values found within the relevant parcel
of wetland, but then we ignore the more complex and less well known
ecosystemic values affected by alteration of the wetland, which may be of
substantial public importance.
Resource economists considering this dilemma have explored ana-
lytic techniques that bridge this gap. A working group convened by the
EPA and Army Corps of Engineers suggested techniques for systematic
identification and assessment of the values affected by wetlands altera-
tion, including those values that evade quantification. 26 This application
of cost-benefit analysis takes a holistic approach, incorporating the im-
pacts of wetland alteration on the uses and values of surrounding natural
(manuscript at 10-11, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Whether such quantifi-
cation is possible remains a subject of debate. Some resource economists have concluded that a
wetlands permitting policy based on a cost-benefit balancing test is technically impractical.
See id. (citing sources); see also MULDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 (detailing reasons that
cost-benefit ratio should not determine critical habitat designation); SCHAMBERGER ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 69 (stating comprehensive dollar estimate of benefits of critical habitat
designation not feasible with available data).
23. These include impact on water circulation, fluctuation and salinity, and containment
levels. They also include assessment of less readily quantified variables, such as impacts on the
ecosystem. 40 C.F.R. § 230.11.
24. The public interest review entails consideration of, inter alia, conservation, aesthetics,
general environmental concerns, wetlands, and fish and wildlife values. It also requires the
agency to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed activity, detrimental effects on other
uses, and need. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a).
25. Cf. Kiker & Lynne, supra note 22 (manuscript at 11-12) (advocating decision-making
methodology that organizes information on all values affected, so that consequences of action
can be fully understood by decision makers and the public).
26. See Clyde F. Kiker et al., Analysis of Impacts of Site-Altering Activities on Bottomland
Hardwood Forest Uses: The Report of the Cultural/Recreational/Economic Workgroup, in
ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND CUMULATIVE IMPACTS (James G. Gosselink et al. eds., 1990)
(manuscript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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areas, as well as the more obvious values within the boundaries of the
parcel.27 It accepts the current limitations of quantitative methods and
seeks to develop complementary methodologies to account for these. 8
A methodology of this type was used in a controversial regulatory
decision involving wetlands in the Green Swamp in central Florida.29
Resource economists, building on the principle of multiple alternative-
multiple attribute evaluation, developed information on existing uses of
the area and the impact of proposed alterations on these uses. The ana-
lysts developed a series of arrays or charts that showed graphically how
six alternative uses of the relevant wetlands correlated to a variety of
values, some of which were difficult to measure quantitatively.30 When
quantification was not appropriate, the arrays indicated whether the cor-
relation was positive, negative, uncertain, or nonexistent. This provided
a systematic framework within which all interested parties were able to
assess the impact of the alternatives on various values. The process went
beyond commonly employed forms of cost-benefit analysis in accommo-
dating the complexity of the natural systems and human values involved.
The analysis avoided the illusory precision of a strained quantification,
and presented the qualitative information that was available in a system-
atic format, providing a clearer view of the policy choices to be made.
Multiple alternative-multiple attribute evaluation provided decision mak-
ers and members of the public an accessible summary of the net impact
of various alternative uses of the wetland parcel.31
Multiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis is not a radical de-
parture from the methods commonly employed in wetlands decisions.
Indeed it is a form of cost-benefit analysis. The question is whether it
moves us in the direction of better or more efficient decision making.
Several features of the analysis are significant in this regard. First, the
analysis encourages and facilitates consideration of more than two op-
tions-thus moving beyond the limiting permit-no permit framework
and presenting decision makers and the public with information on a
variety of uses, providing a broader frame of reference.32 Second, multi-
ple alternative-multiple attribute analysis facilitates systematic compari-
27. Id. (manuscript at 6-11).
28. Id. (manuscript at 32).
29. See Kiker & Lynne, supra note 22 (manuscript at 19-22).
30. See id. (manuscript at 14-16, 20-22).
31. Id. (manuscript at 21-22).
32. For example, the alternatives evaluated might include conversion of the area to two
different agricultural crops, such as soybeans and rice, channelization of a stream adjacent to
the site, levee construction on the site, or conversion to pine plantation or aquaculture. See
Kiker et al., supra note 26 (manuscript at 11, tbls. 4-8).
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son of the impact of two or more options on nonquantifiables, such as
aesthetic and cultural values-something not as easily accomplished by
an unstructured narrative discussion of such values. Third, considera-
tion of the cumulative impact of the options on a variety of nonquantified
values is facilitated by the systematic nature of the analysis of these
values.
These attributes of multiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis
facilitate comparison and more rational selection among options,
notwithstanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with the deci-
sion. This is not to suggest that multiple alternative-multiple attribute
analysis or any other particular technique is a panacea for the problems
associated with resource use decisions. Serious challenges face decision
makers under this methodology as well.33 The more basic point is not
that we should adopt this analytic technique, but that opportunities exist
to improve our decision making. Lawmakers and regulators must main-
tain a broad focus and pay attention to opportunies to cope with uncer-
tainty and complexity.
III. UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEXITY IN ToxIcs REGULATION
A. Lessons from the Past
A second illustration of the shortcomings of our current regulatory
process when confronted with complexity and uncertainty comes from
the field of toxics regulation. Regulatory progress in addressing the
threat posed by toxics has been widely criticized as exceedingly slow.
Under most of our statutory standards, regulation proceeds only when
we have a degree of certainty about the risks that closely approximates
the standards of scientific research-a relatively rare occurrence. We
know very little about most substances, and the slow pace of progress
33. First, this holistic and broader analysis still does not define the relevant values to be
considered. Choices must be made among attributes to be included. These are difficult polit-
ical questions currently, and they will remain so in the future. But it is noteworthy that we
make these decisions when we apply currently employed methodologies; we simply make them
in a less visible, systematic way. Experience suggests that the lack of focus on these normative
questions may make the ultimate regulatory decisions more controversial, not less so. See
supra p. 811. An analysis with more visible and systematic value choices may help to focus
public debate on the important question of what values are relevant.
Second, multiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis does not eliminate the tension be-
tween quantified and unquantified variables. But the point is not perfection. If we know that
current applications of cost-benefit analysis fail to compensate adequately for the shortcomings
of quantitative analysis, then we should remain alert for opportunities to improve our decision-
making structure incrementally, by moving toward more systematic consideration of nonquan-
tified values. Multiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis is an example of such an
opportunity.
April 1994]
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under existing statutes suggests that we will be unable to act on many of
them in the near future. Regulatory priorities are thus often developed
with inadequate knowledge about the potential danger of the many un-
tested substances.
Many have raised questions about the balance that our statutes
strike between the dangers of over- and under-regulation in this area of
extreme uncertainty.3 4 Forceful arguments have been made for greater
consideration of the question of how to make policy decisions in this
climate of uncertainty.35 Assessing the value of quantitative risk assess-
ment and other techniques in the regulatory context and refining their
applications will be important steps in responding to this challenge.3 6
A second important theme in toxics regulation is the failure of our
current laws to address the more complex dimensions of chemical effects
on health and the environment, such as the possibilities of cumulative
and synergistic impacts and noncancer impacts. We continue to operate
under a regime that envisions substance-by-substance testing for cancer
risk, ignoring the possibility that synergistic, cumulative, and noncancer
effects may represent a far more significant threat to health and the envi-
ronment. Great weight is given to the seemingly precise quantitative risk
assessments that agencies develop, sometimes with inadequate attention
to the limited precision of such numbers37 and the many dimensions of
human and environmental health risk for which they fail to account.38
34. Some recent reforms, such as the 1990 amendment of section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. III 1991), represent an effort to achieve progress in controlling toxics
by shifting from a quality-based to a technology-based standard.
35. See, e.g., Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An Es-
say on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 583 (1983); Howard A.
Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under
Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982); cf Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985) (arguing
that public regulation of risk is biased against many progressive, risk-reducing technologies).
36. The recent report of the Carnegie Commission Task Force on Science and Technology
in Judicial and Regulatory Decisionmaking represents an important contribution to this pro-
cess. In the report, CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOV'T, RISK AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993) [hereinafter RISK
AND THE ENVIRONMENT], the task force makes extensive recommendations on agency deci-
sion-making processes and the use of tools such as quantitative risk assessment. This builds on
earlier work done by the EPA under Administrator Reilly. See generally REDUCING RISK,
supra note 18 (Science Advisory Board report reviewing data and methodology supporting risk
assessment, comparison, and reduction, and presenting policy recommendations).
37. See RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 36, at 78; James P. Leape, Quantitative
Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86,
103-13 (1980).
38. The recent debate about comparative or relative risk assessment again raises this issue.
Even supporters of relative risk assessment note that all relevant dimensions of a given risk
cannot be summarized in a single ratio, and that our ability to quantify risks is limited. Thus,
[Vol. 27:809
COPING WITH COMPLEXITY
The history of toxics regulation illustrates how statutes and analytic
techniques that fail to account for complexity and uncertainty can distort
regulation. Like Scylla and Charybdis, complexity and uncertainty
threaten to block regulatory progress. The proliferation of complex
questions and the impossibility of complete and certain answers to them
can paralyze us' like the many heads of Scylla, forcing us to turn back to
the sheltering harbor of the status quo. Swerving to avoid this danger,
we must also avoid the whirlpool of reductionist analyses, in the vortex
of which problems are oversimplified to produce distorted but neat
conclusions.
Charting a course between these two extremes is not easy. Such a
path requires us to make judgments about the cost of under- and over-
regulation and about the limits of our understanding, in light of the val-
ues that impel us to undertake regulation in the first place.3 9 It requires
that we accept and build on that which science can tell us, while recog-
nizing the limits of its value. When we reach those limits, we must find
systematic and coherent strategies for policy choices.
A recent regulatory initiative offers an example of how regulators
can minimize regulatory paralysis by considering both what science can
and cannot tell us. Using this knowledge we can develop processes in
which we make the best possible use of information, mindful of its
limitations.
B. The Use of Expedited Risk Assessment is a Priority-Setting Device
in Toxics Regulation
An important focus for reform of toxics regulation is statutory stan-
dards of proof.' Drawing on insights from philosophy, law, epidemiol-
they are cautious in evaluating the role comparative risk ratios will play in determining regula-
tory priorities. See generally REDUCING RISK, supra note 18, at 19-20, 27, 31, 36-39; Forum:
Should We Set Priorities Based on Risk, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 17-51. Critics raise the
more trenchant objection that relative risk assessment may supplant democratically deter-
mined norms with scientists' moral judgments. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environ-
mental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562,
629-33 (1992).
39. For a discussion of the importance of identifying these policy goals as we evaluate
regulatory approaches, see Christopher H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcino-
gens, If Feasibility Analysis Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1502-05 (1990).
40. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protec-
tive Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 360-66 (1991) (stating
current standards of proof place unrealistic demands on science to produce single, correct
conclusion); see also sources cited supra note 35 (citing works of Howard A. Latin).
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ogy, and toxicology, philosopher Carl Cranor4 1 has evaluated the impact
of standards of proof and scientific assumptions currently employed by
regulators on the regulatory enterprise. In Regulating Toxic Substances,
he examines the policies embedded in scientific assumptions and stan-
dards of proof.42 The question he poses is whether these assumptions
and standards are appropriate to the context of toxic substances
regulation.
This work grew out of his recognition that not every regulatory de-
cision need be made with the same degree of certainty chosen by research
science."3 Indeed, not every decision made by scientists is based on this
degree of proof. Cranor explores the possibilities of a relatively quick
and inexpensive scientifically recognized technique known as expedited
risk assessment.' He concludes that for purposes of some regulatory
decisions-such as decisions to issue warnings and priority setting-we
may do better relying on expedited risk assessments rather than acting
with no basis for judging the risks of the many untested substances, para-
lyzed by the cost and time required to know the impacts of the many
untested substances with ninety-five percent certainty.45 Cranor has
since worked with regulators in California to explore the use of expedited
risk assessment as a tool for obtaining enough certainty about the poten-
tial risks of chemical substances to support a more rational ordering of
regulatory priorities.
Inherent in Cranor's approach is an acceptance of the complexity
and uncertainty that limit our understanding of toxic substances. Rather
than assuming that inaction is the only course possible until we have
sufficient proof to support scientific certainty, it distills what science can
tell us and tries to employ that knowledge in a way that achieves our
policy goals. Nor does the initiative seek to oversimplify the problem
presented by toxics. The simplification of the process is carefully tailored
41. Professor Cranor has had significant exposure to both the law and science of toxic
substances. He was a Master in Studies of Law Fellow at Yale Law School, and worked both
as a legislative aide to Representative George Brown (then a member of the House Committee
on Science, Space and Technology) and with the Office of Technology Assessment as a con-
gressional Fellow. He has also served as a member of the California Proposition 65 Science
Advisory Panel.
42. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND THE LAW 25-48 (1993).
43. Cranor examines in detail the problems with wholesale adoption of a "science inten-
sive" approach-one that demands adherence to the standards of scientific research. Id. at
116-29.
44. Id. at 137-51.
45. Cranor concludes with a chapter discussing the epistemic and moral justification for
this approach. Id. at 152-78.
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to its context: An important consideration in the work was developing a
process that reflects and will better achieve the policies that motivate the
relevant regulatory decisions.46 The end result is an analytic method that
can help us to make better informed policy choices in light of the com-
plexity and uncertainty we face. Lawmakers and regulators seeking to
improve regulation should seek out similar methods, evaluate their
potential for improving regulatory decisions, and facilitate their
implementation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Systematic evaluation of the analytic tools used in environmental
regulation can improve our regulatory decisions in many ways. Given
our commitment to scientific rationality as the foundation for our poli-
cies, we cannot afford to misuse science or to employ analyses that deny
the complex richness of the environment or the human values at stake.
We must consider how well the tools on which we base our policies ac-
count for the complexity of our world and the limits of our
understanding.
There may be other benefits from ensuring that our policies are cho-
sen with a proper respect for complexity and uncertainty. Analytic tech-
niques that present what we know while acknowledging the limits of our
knowledge more clearly present the policy or value choices involved in
regulatory decisions. Such methods tend to make regulatory decisions
more accessible to the public and thus more democratic. 47 Reductionist
methods that pretend to an illusory scientific accuracy tend to obscure
the relevant policy choices from public view.48 Avoiding illusory preci-
sion may improve regulators' accountability. This may help to improve
public confidence and acceptance of regulatory decisions.49
46. Id. at 146. Lawmakers, regulators, or others evaluating the need for reform may differ
with Cranor on the precise balance of policies embedded in the relevant statutes, and thus
reach a different conclusion about the propriety of relying on expedited risk assessment for
priority setting. Nonetheless, the analysis Cranor offers in support of the use of expedited risk
assessment for priority setting suggests a fruitful framework in which to evaluate regulatory
reforms in this area. If one agrees that current methods for setting regulatory priorities fail to
account for all that science can usefully tell us because assumptions embedded in regulatory
standards of proof do not conform to the values expressed in our statutes, then it makes sense
to pay greater attention to evolving techniques in which assumptions and constraints may
better comport with regulatory values.
47. See Kiker & Lynne, supra note 22 (manuscript at 12, 20).
48. See RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 36, at 87-90.
49. This was apparently the case with the Green Swamp decision. See Kiker & Lynne,
supra note 22 (manuscript at 21-23).
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Clearer analysis of the factual and normative issues may also pro-
mote greater public responsibility for policy choices. Regulatory deci-
sions that oversimplify the choices involved, disguise relevant policy
choices as science, or favor the status quo automatically when faced with
a certain level of complexity or doubt encourage public hostility. Greater
public understanding of the factual and normative conflicts embedded in
regulatory policy will not overcome the human tendency to blame others
for intractable problems and difficult choices, but it may facilitate public
acceptance of responsibility for the trade offs that our regulatory policies
demand.5
Finally, although better tools for coping with complex and uncertain
questions will not eliminate the controversy over the policy decisions to
be made, they may reduce the pressure on agencies to justify as "science"
decisions that science does not demand.
We cannot avoid the complexity that we have belatedly realized sur-
rounds us. Our competing demands for the environment in its unspoiled
state and use of its raw materials will continue to create environmental
conflicts. The ever-increasing pressures of population growth and de-
mands for higher standards of living make it critical that we consider the
consequences of our policies clearly, that we make choices based on what
we know, but always mindful of that which we do not.
50. Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus's efforts to improve risk communi-
cation and involve members of affected communities in decisions regarding hazardous waste
clean ups were premised in part on this notion. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk,
and Public Policy, 221 Sci. 1026, 1028 (1983); William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and
Democracy, ISsuEs Sc:. & TECH., Spring 1985, at 19.
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